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 Though statistics clearly indicate “violent crime” in the 
United States is declining1, the question of whether a crime is 
considered “violent” for the purposes of the law is as prevalent as 
ever.2 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
(CCCA)3 in an effort to improve federal criminal laws.4 The Act 
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 See Id. 
3
 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 
Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections amongst U.S.C. titles 
18, 21, 28, 29 and 34).  
1
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2 
imposed mandatory minimum sentences for offenders who committed 
criminal offenses.5 Additionally, the CCCA increased penalties for 
offenses considered to be violent crimes.6  
Whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime of 
violence is an important question of law that courts must decide. 
Should a court find a crime of violence occurred, the question 
becomes whether the defendant’s prior convictions should factor into 
sentencing.7 The latter question is often left for the appellate courts to 
resolve after a defendant appeals his or her sentencing, post-trial. In 
such appeals, the defendant typically alleges that the district court’s 
decision to enhance sentencing based on the defendant’s prior history 
of violent crime was improper. However, there are some instances 
when courts must decide such an issue before any proceedings begin, 
including charges brought under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
discussed in Section III of this comment.  
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),8 for example, the 
court can increase the mandatory minimum sentence from ten to 
fifteen years for federal defendants who have three prior convictions 
for a crime that “has as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”9 
Problems for the courts appear in the vague nature of this definition. 
Two common issues arise for courts when interpreting the statutory 
language: 1) determining what constitutes “physical force,” as well as 
to what degree of physical force must be used and 2) determining 
whether a “crime of violence” includes crimes that are intentional or 
accidental.10  
                                                                                                                   
4
 HILLEL SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45220. THE FEDERAL “CRIME OF 
VIOLENCE” DEFINITION: OVERVIEW AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2018) 
(HEREINAFTER “SMITH”). 
5




 The law contemplates both state and federal convictions.  
8
 Pub. L. No 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
9
 United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 5032 (2012)).   
10
  See Smith, supra note 4.  
2
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3 
As for the first concern, most circuits, including the Seventh 
Circuit, agree that “physical force” must be violent or destructive in 
nature.11 Some courts, such as the Eleventh Circuit, have strayed from 
this idea and concluded that there needs to be violent force to qualify a 
crime as one of violence.12  
Although courts can look to precedent as guides to their analysis, 
individual states draft their criminal statutes differently, making it 
difficult to apply one standard to all situations. Several landmark 
Supreme Court decisions have clarified state statutes that are unclear 
about whether certain crimes fall under a “crime of violence” category. 
One such case is Johnson v. United States discussed later in this 
comment. 13 
Part I of this Comment explores various legislation requiring 
the court’s analysis for “crimes of violence,” including the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, as well as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines related to “Crimes 
of Violence,” including case law invalidating some of the provisions 
of these statutes; Part II of this comment explores how courts 
approach the interpretation of Crimes of Violence and the recent 
circuit and federal decisions that aid them in the process; Part III of 
this comment discusses the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act and 
implications for juveniles being transferred to adult proceedings based 
on this statute in particular and the consequences in general;  Part IV 
of this Comment addresses how the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. D.D.B. is unique, changing the court’s analysis by 
concluding that attempted robbery is not a crime of violence in 
                                                 
11
 See Whyte v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 463, 468-69 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Rede-Mendez, 680 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Haileselassie, 668 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2012); Singh v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 
1228, 123334 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Benegas-Ornelas, 348 F.3d 
1273, 1275 (10th Cir. 2003); Chrzanoski Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188, 195-97 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2001). 
12
 See Smith, supra note 4. 
13
 Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). 
3
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4 
Indiana, paving a path for courts to use their discretion to keep 
juveniles out of adult proceedings.  
 
PART I – LEGISLATION HISTORY DEFINING “CRIMES 
OF VIOLENCE” 
A court’s decision to label crimes as “crimes of violence” is one 
of discretion rather than statutory language. In fact, the specific term 
“crime of violence” does not explicitly appear in statutes like the 
ACCA or the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.14 The Seventh Circuit 
explained in United States v. Edwards that its use of the term “crime of 
violence” is the language that courts have adopted in reference to the 
statutory language guiding enhancement provisions based on prior 
crimes.15 In Edwards, the court had to determine whether the 
petitioner’s prior conviction in Wisconsin for burglary qualified as a 
crime of violence.16 In doing so, the court provided a framework to 
interpret whether a crime is a crime of violence.17 The court stated that 
“if state law defines the offense more broadly than the [Federal 
Sentencing] Guidelines, the prior conviction doesn’t qualify as a crime 
of violence, even if the defendant’s conduct satisfies all of the 
elements of the Guidelines offense.”18 This reasoning was echoed by 
Justice Rovner in D.D.B.19 
The foregoing indicates the importance of this issue. Regardless 
of whether the alleged latest crime carries a lesser sentence, a court’s 
determination that a defendant’s previous conviction was for a crime 
of violence affects sentencing guidelines. Even if the defendant’s most 
                                                 
14
 The specific language in both of those statutes is included in their respective 
places in this comment.  
15
 836 F.3d 831, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2016) (referencing U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2)(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).  
16
 United States v. Edwards, 836 F. 3d 831, 836 (7th Cir. 2016).  
17
 See generally Id.  
18
 Id. at 833 
19
 United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018).  
4
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5 
recent crime carries a lesser sentence, if he or she were to be found 
guilty, that determination could increase the defendant’s ultimate 
sentence. The courts are not the only governmental body struggling 
with the definitions of violent crime. In fact, with recent decisions 
striking down statutory language, the issue of categorizing violent 
crime is equally as challenging at the legislative level.  
 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA)20 is one 
of the most extensive reform legislations in modern American 
history.21 Signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 12, 
1984, the CCCA’s purpose was to clean up the crime problem in 
society at the time.22 The more significant sections of the Act, amongst 
others, covered regulation on issues such as bail reform, sentencing, 
and the insanity defense.23 In a significant portion of the CCCA, the 
legislature passed the Sentencing Reform Act24 intended to create a 
uniform system of sentencing and to correct past leniency for serious 
offenders.25 The Sentencing Reform Act established a U.S. Sentencing 
Commission responsible for recommending and drafting sentencing 
guidelines for federal judges.26 In an effort to increase accountability 
in the judiciary, judges are required to explain why they strayed from 
                                                 
20
 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, tit. II, 98 





 Id.  
23
 Id.  
24
 Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended in 
scattered section among U.S.C. titles 18 and 28).  
25
 See, generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM 




 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N ANN. REP. 137974 (1990).  
5
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6 
the guidelines if they choose to do so.27 After surviving a 
constitutional challenge, the guidelines took effect in late 1989.28 As a 
result, the commission also drafted new guidelines for mandatory 
minimum sentencing provisions aimed at targeting drug and weapon 
offenses, as well as recidivist offenders.29 
Under the CCCA, codified under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a crime of 
violence is defined as: 
“(a) an offense that has an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or 
property of another, or 
 
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense.”30  
 
 
Armed Career Criminal Act 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was also enacted in 
1984 as a deterrence effort to curb recidivism.31 The ACCA requires a 
mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence for felons who have 





 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-
reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf>; see also 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  
29
 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available at 
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-
reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf>. 
30 18 U.S.C. § 16 (a),(b).  
31
 Comment, Armed Career Criminal Act – Residual Clause – Johnson v. 
United States, 129 HARV. L. REV. 301, 308 (2015) [hereinafter “ACA Comment”]. 
6
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7 
three prior convictions for violent offenses or serious drug crimes 
upon a conviction for an offense involving a firearm.32 The ACCA 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of 
juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a 
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable 
by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that: 
 
(i) has an element of the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another; or  
 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another…”33  
 
Specifically, the ACCA names burglary, arson, extortion, and 
crimes involving explosives as violent felonies.34 
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States35 
considered whether Florida’s felony battery offense constituted a 
violent felony under the ACCA.36 Under this statute, a battery is 
committed by “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing]” another 
person.37 The Court had to determine whether that “has as an element 
the use … of physical force against the person of another.”38 In order 
to enhance Johnson’s sentence in the new offense, three of Johnson’s 
five prior felony convictions would have had to be found to be 
                                                 
32
 Id. at 309. 
33
 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  
34
 See ACA Comment, supra note 31.  
35
 See Johnson, supra note 13.  
36
 Id. at 135. 
37
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8 
“violent felonies.”39 At his sentencing, Johnson disputed his prior 
battery conviction as a violent crime on the premise that battery in 
Florida is typically a first-degree misdemeanor and the only reason it 
was enhanced to a third-degree felony was because of his prior felony 
record.40 Although Johnson urged the Court to rely on state precedent, 
the court made it clear that the interpretation of state statutes is a 
question of federal law, and not state law.41 Therefore, the Court 
looked to federal precedent to determine if the state statute qualifies as 
a violent crime.42 The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion 
and declined to categorize battery as a violent crime under the Florida 
statute and sentencing paradigm because the action required in 
Florida’s statute did not amount to “physical force” in the context of 
“violent felony”.43 
 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Federal “Crime of Violence” 
Definition 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines44 provide an extensive 
roadmap of how judges should sentence defendants upon conviction. 
Specific to crimes of violence, the guidelines require enhancements for 
certain crimes that qualify under the definition for violent crimes. 
Typically, the issue of whether a crime is violent is critical in the 
sentencing stage of the case proceedings. The Guidelines define a 
crime of violence as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
39




 Id. at 138. 
42
 Id.  
43
 Id. at 143-145 
44
 Hereinafter the “Guidelines.” 
8
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9 
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under 
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that – 
 
 (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another or,  
 
 (2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, 
aggravated assault, a forcible sex offense, robbery, arson, 
extortion, or the use or unlawful possession of a firearm 
described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or explosive material as 
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).45  
 
Courts examine three factors when determining whether a crime is 
a crime of violence: (1) the underlying conduct of a criminal offense, 
the statutory elements of the offense, or a combination of both to 
determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction is for a crime of 
violence; (2) degree of force necessary to satisfy the “physical force” 
element in the statutory crime of violence definition and (3) examining 
whether the crime requires a specific mental state.46 The court in 
D.D.B., as analyzed further in Section IV of this comment, focused 
strictly on the third prong of analysis as it explored whether the crime 
of attempted robbery requires a specific mental state.47 
The definition of a “crime of violence” lacked clarity, and in 
2018, the Supreme Court addressed this issue.48 In Sessions v. Dimaya, 
the Court settled the issue when it held that the residual clause of the 
federal “crime of violence” definition was unconstitutionally vague.49 
The residual clause of the statute is the portion under section 16(b) 
                                                 
45
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(A)(2) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015).  
46
 Smith, supra note 4, at 4. 
47
 United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2018). 
48
 See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018). 
49
 Id. at 1210.  
9
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10 
stating “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk of physical injury.”50 The Court relied on its 
analysis in Johnson to guide its ultimate ruling in Sessions, finding 
that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Johnson is precisely applicable in this 
case.51  
By diving into Johnson’s ruling, Justice Kagan explained how two 
features of the residual clause rendered it unconstitutionally vague.52 
First, the residual clause created “grave uncertainty about how to 
estimate the risk posed by a crime” because it demanded that the judge 
decide what “kind of conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of a crime 
involves.”53 In fact, the ACCA lacked guidance for judges and left the 
“ordinary case” up to subjective interpretation.54 Second, the residual 
clause did not offer a clear “threshold level of risk [which] made any 
given crime a ‘violent felony.’”55 In other words, the residual clause 
demanded that the court apply the “serious potential risk” standard to 
“an idealized ordinary case of the crime.”56 Essentially, the language 
of the residual clause was too unpredictable to survive constitutional 
scrutiny because of its “indeterminacy about how to measure the risk 
posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for 
the crime to qualify as a violent felony.”57 By using a categorical 
approach analysis, the Supreme Court held that under the 18 U.S.C. § 
16, statute that defines “aggravated felonies” for immigration purposes 
is unconstitutionally vague because it demands interpretation of an 
ordinary-case requirement and a risk threshold, resulting in arbitrary 
conclusions and does not give fair notice.58 
                                                 
50
 Id. at 1211. 
51












 Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2005)). 
58
 Id. at 1223 
10
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Although a legal definition of a violent crime does not seem 
significant, the court’s decision about whether a crime is one “of 
violence” has tremendous consequences for the defendant. For 
example, in the immigration context under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, like in Sessions, “a non-U.S. national who commits a 
‘crime of violence’ for which the term of imprisonment is at least one 
year may face significant immigration consequences, including being 
subject to removal from the country and thereafter rendered generally 
ineligible for readmission.”59 Additionally, the consequences for 
juvenile offenders are even more dire as discussed in Section IV.  
 
PART II - JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION 
In order to determine whether an offense is a crime of violence, 
courts most often use the categorical approach.60 When using the 
categorical approach, courts focus on the statutory definition of the 
prior offense.61 The court must assess whether “the elements of the 
offense are the type that would justify its inclusion . . . without 
inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.”62 When 
interpreting state statutes, federal courts must determine whether the 
state law defines the offense more broadly than the Guidelines. If so, 
then the conviction cannot qualify as a crime of violence even if the 
defendant’s conduct satisfies the Guidelines elements.63 When 
utilizing this analysis, courts do not look to the facts that arose in the 
                                                 
59
 See Smith, supra note 4 (quotations in original). 
60
 See United States v. Edwards, 836 F. 3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1216 (2018). 
61
 See Id. 
62
 James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007); see also Mathis v. United 
States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).  
63
 See Edwards, 836 F.3d at 833 (quoting Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2245 (2016)); (“’Elements’ are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal 
definition, which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction; 
they are distinct from ‘facts,’ which are mere real-world things – extraneous to the 
crime’s legal requirements and thus ignored by the categorical approach.”) 
11
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conviction, but only to the statutory elements of the offense.64 The 
Supreme Court developed the categorical approach as a way to address 
constitutional concerns that might arise if the court solely focuses on 
the facts of the conviction.65 Specifically, the focus was to “avoid[ ] 
the Sixth Amendment concerns that would arise from sentencing 
courts’ making findings of fact that properly belong to juries.”66 
Notably, there is a split in the Supreme Court about the use of the 
categorical-approach in residual clause cases.67 
However, when statutes include multiple modes of commission, 
the courts use a modified categorical approach.68 Through this 
approach, appellate courts are able to reference the convicting court’s 
record, such as charging documents and plea agreements, to determine 
which particular element of the offense the prior conviction at issue 
was for.69 Under this approach, the court still does not take into 
consideration the facts of the conviction.70 
There is a third option – the underlying-conduct approach, which 
the courts do not implement often.71 This approach allows courts to 
                                                 
64
 Smith, supra note 4; see also Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 
(2013).  
65
 Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217 (2018). 
66
 Id.; see also Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 267. 
67
 See Sessions, supra note 49, at 1216; but see Thomas dissent at 1242, “[I]f 
the Court thinks that §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because of the ‘categorical 
approach,’ . . .  then the Court should abandon that approach – not insist on reading 
it into statutes and then strike them down.”); see also Thomas dissent at 1252, 
“Instead of asking whether the ordinary case of an alien’s offense presents a 
substantial risk of physical force, courts should ask whether the alien’s actual 
underlying conduct presents a substantial risk of physical force.”  
68
 United States v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Nijhawan v. 
Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009) (permitting a court to determine which statutory 
phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record). 
69
 See Id. at 633.   
70
 Id.; see also United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]dditional materials . . . may be used only to determine which crime within a 
statute the defendant committed, not how he committed that crime.”) 
71
 See Sessions, supra note 49, at 1216 (stating that §16(b) cannot be 
interpreted by inquiring only into the elements of a crime) (Thomas J. Dissenting).  
12
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consider the specific facts in which a defendant committed a crime.72 
Justice Thomas discusses and favors this approach when analyzing 
cases regarding the residual clause of statutes.73 This approach is most 
controversial, however, due to constitutional concerns of reassessing 
facts that were considered by the fact-finder.74 An instance where the 
underlying-conduct approach is appropriate in the current pattern of 
court interpretation is when a statute includes fact-specific language.75 
 
PART III - JUVENILE IMPACT OF CURRENT “CRIME OF 
VIOLENCE” ANALYSIS UNDER THE FEDERAL JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY ACT (§ 5032) 
The government may obtain jurisdiction over juvenile offenders 
and then petition to transfer juvenile cases to adult court if certain 
elements of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), codified 
at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (“section 5032”), are met.76 Under the FJDA, a 
juvenile is “a person who has not attained his eighteenth birthday, or 
for the purpose of proceedings and disposition under this chapter for 
an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, a person who has not attained 
his twenty-first birthday.77 On the other hand, “juvenile delinquency” 
is “the violation of a law of the United States committed by a juvenile 
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult…”78 
                                                 
72
 Id.  
73
 Id. at 1256 (discussing the favorability of the underlying-conduct approach) 
(Thomas J. dissenting).  
74
 Id. at 1216.  
75
 See United States. v. Rogers, 804 F.3d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating 
that an exception under 42 § 16911(5)(C) uses fact-specific language and therefore 
the court must use a conduct-based inquiry to determine whether the Petitioner’s 
conduct qualified under consensual sexual conduct).  
76
 18 U.S.C. § 5032; but see United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 
71 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate unless the 
government establishes that prosecution as an adult is warranted.”). 
77
 Taylor Imperiale, Keeping Juvenile Conduct in Juvenile Court: Why the 
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act Does Not and Should Not Contain a Ratification 
Exception, 2018 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 289. 
78
 Id.  
13
Derkacz: The Anatomy of Violent Crime: How Judicial Analysis for “Crimes o
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
14 
Under section 5032, a juvenile is first protected against being 
processed in federal court by prohibiting the government from 
attaining jurisdiction over the juvenile entirely unless one of three 
exceptions apply:  
 
“(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does 
not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said 
juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency; (2) 
the State does not have available programs and services adequate for 
the needs of juveniles; or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence 
that is a felony…”79  
 
Then, once the government attains jurisdiction of the juvenile, the 
government may petition the court to transfer the juvenile to adult 
court through either the mandatory provision or the discretionary 
provision.80   
Under the mandatory provision, the transfer of a juvenile to adult 
court is mandatory if three conditions are met: (1) the juvenile 
committed the offense after his sixteenth birthday; (2) the charged 
offense is a felony that “has an element thereof the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”; and 
(3) the juvenile has previously been found guilty of a crime that “has 
as an element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another.”81 However, judges have 
discretion to transfer a juvenile to adult proceedings if the juvenile 
commits certain enumerated offenses, such as distribution of 
controlled substances, after his or her fifteenth birthday.82 A basis for 
                                                 
79
 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
80
 See e.g., United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000).  
81
 18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also United States v. D.J.H, 179 F.Supp.3d 866, 874 
(2016) (holding that carjacking satisfies the second requirement for mandatory 
transfer under § 5032 because it has “an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force, and thus satisfies the second requirement for 
mandatory transfer”).  
82
 18 U.S.C. § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 
69 (2d Cir. 1995).  
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this kind of transfer can be satisfied if the prosecution can justify that 
it is in the interest of justice.83 In order to make a determination 
regarding whether the transfer would be in the interest of justice, the 
court must consider and weigh factors included in the statute.84 
Under the discretionary provision, the court can deny the 
government’s motion to transfer the juvenile to adult court after 
weighing all appropriate statutory factors under section 5032.85 A 
transfer under this provision can be denied when, after weighing the 
factors, the court determines that there is a more rehabilitative 
approach that will be more helpful to the juvenile involved.86 For 
example, in U.S. v. Juvenile Male No. 1, the district court reversed a 
recommendation made by a magistrate judge and denied the 
governments motion for transfer on the basis that the transfer would 
not serve the interest of justice.87 According to the district court, the 
juvenile had a variety of factors in his life that weighed in favor of 
continuing juvenile proceedings. This allowed the juvenile to receive 
proper rehabilitative treatment available through the juvenile 
adjudication process that was not available if he were prosecuted as an 
                                                 
83
 § 381. Prosecution under youthful offender statutes – under federal law; see 
also United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1996); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
5032. 
84
 See 18 U.S.C § 5032. The statute considers “age and social background of 
the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s 
prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present intellectual development and 
psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s 
response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat the 
juvenile’s behavioral problems. In considering the nature of the offense, as required 
by this paragraph, the court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile played a 
leadership role in an organization, or otherwise influenced other persons to take part 
in criminal activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled substances or 
firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor of a transfer to adult 
status, but the absence of this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.”  
85
 See United States v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1995). 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. at 70. 
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16 
adult.88 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion is denying the government’s motion for the 
juvenile’s transfer.89 In its conclusion, the Second Circuit enumerated 
the spirit of the discretionary provision: 
 
“Society has not assisted [I.R.] in alleviating the scars that 
have marked his emotional and psychological development to 
date. A strict law and order concept fails to recognize that the 
poor choices I.R. has made reflect, in part, the limited 
positive guidance in his development. Congress has provided 
juvenile adjudication as an alternative to adult prosecution. 
That reflects a hope that the disastrous effects of the 
environment in which I.R. has grown can be reversed. In the 
interests of justice, one last effort off the downward course of 
life I.R. has followed is the more appropriate choice.”90 
 
A juvenile’s transfer into adult court has tremendous 
consequences for the delinquent as “nothing can be more critical to the 
accused than determining whether there will be a guilt determining 
process in an adult-type criminal trial … [I]f jurisdiction is waived to 
the adult court, the accused may be incarcerated for much longer and 
lose certain rights of his citizenship.”91 Annually, about 250,000 
juveniles are prosecuted and sentenced in adult federal court.92 This 
gives the courts reason to assess juvenile criminal history even more 
carefully than for adults. Although there is precedent and courts 
routinely examine what constitutes crimes of violence, there is no 
indication that they have created a uniform standard, as demonstrated 
                                                 
88
 Id. (district court stated that “I.R. was a ‘product of poverty,’ ‘[a]n angry 
child [who] appears to have been simply allowed to walk away.’” Additionally, the 
court noted the juvenile’s “’untapped learning ability’ and his ability to distinguish 
right from wrong.”). 
89
 Id. at 71-72.  
90
 Id. at 70. 
91
 Imperiale, supra note 79.  
92
 Charles Curlett, and Lauren McLarney, Journey into Juvenile Justice, 
FEDERAL LAWYER, 64 FEB FEDRLAW 10 (2017).  
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/9
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
17 
by the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in D.D.B., concluding that 
attempted robbery under the Indiana statute is not a violent crime.93    
PART IV - ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. D.D.B 
The Seventh Circuit addressed a juvenile transfer request and thus 
discussed whether a juvenile’s previous conviction for attempted 
robbery is a violent crime under Indiana law in United States v. 
D.D.B.94 In this case, D.D.B., a juvenile defendant, was charged with 
the robbery of a pharmacy under the United States Criminal Code. The 
United States petitioned the court to transfer D.D.B to adult court, 
under 18 U.S.C. § 5032, claiming that the juvenile met the transfer 
criteria for having a prior conviction for attempted robbery in 
Indiana.95 The issue that the court had to decide was whether D.D.B.’s 
prior conviction for attempted robbery in Indiana qualified as a violent 
crime under the Indiana statute.96 Specifically, they had to determine 
whether attempted robbery as drafted by the Indiana statute “has an 
element thereof the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”97 Ultimately, in a unanimous 
decision authored by Justice Rovner, the Seventh Circuit made a two-
part holding: (1) that the juvenile defendant’s prior conviction for 
attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime that could be used 
to transfer D.D.B from juvenile to adult court under section 5032, 
contrary to precedent; and (2) that the district court’s blanket rule that 
any attempted violent felony is itself a violent felony in Indiana is in 
error and thus any case with such a holding must be vacated and 
remanded.98  
It is important to examine the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
precedential cases to understand why the court ruled as it did in 
                                                 
93
 United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2018). 
94
 See generally, Id.  
95
 Id. at 686.  
96
 Id.  
97
 Id. at 687.  
98
 Id. at 693 
17
Derkacz: The Anatomy of Violent Crime: How Judicial Analysis for “Crimes o
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
18 
D.D.B. that attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime.99 
Using a categorical approach in their analysis, the court engaged in a 
lengthy discussion about the element of intent.100 In that discussion, 
the court revisited its prior decision in United States v. Duncan.101 In 
United States v. Duncan, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether a 
robbery conviction under Indiana law qualified as a crime of violence 
and could therefore satisfy the violent crime enhancement provision 
under the ACCA.102 In Duncan, the defendant was sentenced to fifteen 
years instead of ten because he had three prior convictions of robbery 
in Indiana.103 The Seventh Circuit in Duncan had to determine what 
the Indiana legislature meant when it included the language “putting 
any person in fear” in its robbery statute.104 In order to do so, the Court 
had to reference Indiana case law.105  
First, the Court referenced United States v. Lewis, in which it had 
reasoned that “because robbery ‘entails taking property from the 
person of another by force or threat,’ it has as an element ‘the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.’”106 Even without 
using actual force, “a robbery intrinsically involves ‘conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,’ making 
it a crime of violence…”107 Second, the Court referenced Jones v. 
State, an Indiana court decision which determined that robbery by fear 
can be shown by circumstances that communicate an implicit threat to 
use physical force, even if there is no explicit threat.108 Thus, in 
Duncan, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that 
                                                 
99
 See United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016); see Hill v. 
United States, 877 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2017).  
100
 United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2018). 
101
 Id. at 689-690 
102
 Duncan, 833 F.3d at 752.  
103
 Id. at 753. 
104
 Id. at 752. 
105
 Id.  
106
 United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005). 
107
 Id.  
108
 Jones v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. App. 2007) 
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robbery under Indiana law is a violent felony applicable to the 
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.109 
Further, in D.D.B. the court discussed Hill v. United States, where 
it held that “when a substantive offense would be a violent felony 
under § 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense 
also is a violent felony.”110 Under this precedent, the Court in D.D.B. 
could have ruled that attempted robbery is a crime of violence since 
the court in Duncan determined that robbery under Indiana law is a 
violent felony.111 However, Justice Rovner noted in the D.D.B. opinion 
that the holding in Hill is “premised on the notion that ‘a conviction of 
attempt requires proof of intent to commit all elements of the 
completed crime.’”112 The reasoning in Hill relied on two premises – 
the first, that “an element of attempted force operates the same as an 
element of completed force,” and second, that “conviction of attempt 
requires proof of intent to commit all elements of the completed 
crime.”113 This was precisely Judge Hamilton’s point in the Morris v. 
United States concurrence, reasoning that “[a]ttempt requires intent to 
commit the completed crime plus a substantial step toward its 
completion.”114 
 In 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States reached its own 
conclusion about similar issues.115 The question in the controversial 
Mathis v. United States was whether the Armed Career Criminal Act 
creates an exception where a defendant can still have an enhanced 
sentence if a conviction under a statute lists multiple, alternative 
means of satisfying one or more of its elements.116 In its decision, the 
                                                 
109
 United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2016). 
110
 Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2016). 
111
 See Duncan, 833 F.3d at 758. 
112
 D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 690; Hill, 877 F.3d at 719; see also Morris  
v. United States, 827 F.3d 696, 698-99 (7th Cir. 2016) (Hamilton, J., 
concurring).  
113
 D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 690.  
114
 Morris v. United States, 827 F.3d at 698 (Hamilton, J., Concurrence).  
115
 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).  
116
 Id. at 2248. 
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Supreme Court held that robbery is in fact not a violent crime under 
Iowa statute and “a prior conviction does not qualify as the generic 
form of a predicate violent felony” (the commonly understood version 
of a crime) “if the element of the crime of conviction is broader than 
an element of the generic offense.”117  
Therefore, after implementing a categorical approach, the court in 
D.D.B. ultimately held that the juvenile defendant’s prior conviction 
for attempted robbery did not qualify as a violent crime that could be 
used to transfer D.D.B from juvenile to adult court under section 5032 
because Indiana’s attempt statute does not require the government to 
prove intent.118 Because the statute does not require the government to 
prove intent, no fact-finder during D.D.B.’s trial ever made a 
determination that he had any intent to commit any of the elements of 
robbery.119 Further, the Court held that the district court’s blanket rule 
that any attempted violent felony is itself a violent felony in Indiana is 
in error and thus any case with such a holding must be vacated and 
remanded.120 
 
The Court in D.D.B Lays a Foundation for Reform of the 
Juvenile Delinquency Act Under Section 5032 
Although the Seventh Circuit came to the correct decision in its 
analysis by not categorizing attempted robbery as a violent crime for 
purposes of a juvenile transfer order under section 5032, this could 
have been an opportunity for the court to address the differences 
between determining “crimes of violence” for purposes of juvenile 
delinquency and “crimes of violence” for purposes of imposing 
mandatory minimum sentencing under repeat offender statutes. 
Although any individual facing a higher sentence under an 
enhancement provision has a lot at stake in the court’s decision of 
                                                 
117
 Id. at 2245. 
118
 D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 691. 
119
 Id. at 692. 
120
 Id. at 693. 
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what constitutes a violent crime in a past conviction, it is detrimental 
for juveniles who are still on the cusp of a higher rehabilitative age.121 
In its analysis, as in all analysis concerning violent crime, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on adult proceeding cases entirely, specifically 
those used in mandatory minimum cases. In a way, the Seventh 
Circuit’s analysis can be used as a guide to expand interpretation 
approaches for other cases of similarly situated juveniles to avoid 
transfer into adult proceedings. The court here could have instead 
relied on more precedent cases in which a juvenile’s crime in 
particular is being assessed on whether it should count as a crime of 
violence. The problem with that is there is not much precedent where 
the juvenile’s prior conviction is at issue.  
In U.S. v. M.C.E., the Ninth Circuit was presented with whether 
residential burglary is a crime of violence under Washington law, 
which would qualify M.C.E. for mandatory transfer to adult court 
under section 5032.122 The court used the categorical approach and did 
not look to the facts of the case to see whether the conduct “resulted in 
violence or a substantial risk of violence.”123 The compelling point in 
this case is M.C.E.’s argument as to why residential burglary should 
not be considered a violent crime.124  According to M.C.E.,  the Court 
should “set aside the cases [finding residential burglary to be a crime 
of violence] as irrelevant because they address the question in the 
context of federal sentence-enhancement statutes unrelated to the 
juvenile transfer provision at issue here.”125  
In response, the Ninth Circuit stated that the difference in purpose 
is not relevant and can only serve as a distinction.126 In its holding, the 
court qualified residential burglary as a crime of violence “because of 
their conclusions about the nature of residential burglary itself, not 
                                                 
121
 Imperiale, supra note 79, at 301.  
 
122
 United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 2000). 
123
 Id. at 1255. 
124




 Id.  
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because of the particularities of federal sentencing statutes.”127 The 
court stated that “[w]hether residential burglary is a crime that creates 
a substantial risk of violence turns on the dangers inherent in the 
commission of residential burglary, not on whether that question is 
considered in the context of sentencing under the Armed Career 
Criminals Act or transfer to adult status under §5032.”128 In general, 
the court should have considered juvenile convictions in the first place 
(even if through the transfer statute). It is nonsensical to treat juveniles 
the same as recidivist convicted adult criminals.  
First, courts should expand their approaches when handling prior 
convictions for juveniles in transfer decisions. Although the 
categorical, or modified categorical approaches, are mechanical and 
logical methods for determining predicate offenses, they limit the 
court’s ability to consider facts of the case when utilizing them. Courts 
may reference the trial record and charging documents when applying 
the modified categorical approach, but in a juvenile transfer situation 
the court should develop an analysis that does consider the facts in 
order to give the juvenile a substantially greater chance at not being 
tried as an adult. For instance, by implementing the underlying-
conduct approach, the court would have discretion about whether the 
facts of the case can keep the juvenile out of adult proceedings. For 
instance, section 5032 of the FJDA states:  
 
“In considering the nature of the offense, as required by this 
paragraph, the court shall consider the extent to which the 
juvenile played a leadership role in an organization, or 
otherwise influenced other persons to take part in criminal 
activities, involving the use or distribution of controlled 
substances or firearms. Such a factor, if found to exist, shall 
weigh in favor of a transfer to adult status, but the absence of 
this factor shall not preclude such a transfer.”129 
 
                                                 
127
 Id.  
128
 Id.  
129
 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 
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Under the discretionary provision, those are some of the factors 
the court must consider and weigh when deciding if transfer is 
appropriate to serve the interests of justice.130 All of those factors are 
fact-based and if the court is to consider the facts of the particular 
situation when determining whether the juvenile should be transferred 
to adult court, then it should follow the same analysis when 
considering the past offense and whether it is violent. Above all, the 
criminal law is meant to rehabilitate offenders and juveniles even more 
so, as young people are more capable of rehabilitation.131 However, 
despite their acknowledgement that juvenile conduct “is not as morally 
reprehensible as that of an adult,” courts continue to apply the same 
standard of analysis as they do in repeat adult offender situations.132  
Neurological research has shown that juvenile offenders do not 
possess the same requisite mens rea culpability to reach the threshold 
of adult convictions and should thus not be presented with the level of 
sentencing that comes with it.133 Unfortunately, the clear consequence 
of being transferred into adult proceedings means receiving adult 
sentences. The FJDA aims to hold juveniles accountable for adult 
conduct appropriately, as it should. However, an alternative to 
transferring juveniles to adult court should at least be an option when 
the facts of the conduct illustrate the juvenile’s ability to rehabilitate.  
On the other hand, the Court’s refusal in D.D.B. to look to the 
facts of his prior conviction in order to do a thorough analysis of 
whether he had intent to commit a robbery served to his advantage as 
he was ultimately not transferred to adult court.134 
Courts also argue that the transfer statute does not increase 
punishment for juveniles, per se, but only establishes jurisdiction over 
                                                 
130
 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 
131
 Imperiale, supra note 79, at 301. 
132
 Id.  
133
 Id., at 303. 
134
 D.D.B., 903 F.3d at 692. (“Intent is not an element and so a conviction by 
itself does not establish that the defendant had intent. He could simply knowingly 
take a substantial step toward the taking of property through force or fear. One 
would have to look behind the conviction to the underlying facts to know if he had 
the intent to commit the crime, and this we cannot do.”) 
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the juvenile.135 Although that is the case in the transfer juvenile cases, 
once a juvenile is in fact transferred to adult court, they face the same 
consequences and sentencing as adult defendants – taking away 
jurisdiction from juvenile adjudication and rehabilitative resources 
designed for juveniles.  
CONCLUSION 
Under section 5032, courts have significant discretion on whether 
to transfer juveniles to adult proceedings. Considering the lifelong 
consequences that such a transfer can have on juveniles, courts should 
do everything in their power not to transfer them unless dire 
circumstances warrant such a transfer. It can be further argued that one 
juvenile conviction of a violent crime in a juvenile’s criminal history, 
such as attempted robbery, should not be grounds to transfer if the 
facts surrounding the attempted robbery, analyzed through an 
underlying-conduct approach, indicate that the juvenile has potential 
for rehabilitation and did not play a leadership role in the attempted 
robbery. Therefore, although the Seventh Circuit in D.D.B. was correct 
in it its approach when analyzing whether attempted robbery was 
considered a violent crime under Indiana Statute in this specific 
instance, it could have considered expanding their analysis to an 





                                                 
135
 See United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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